Peter J. Lewis
Professor of Philosophy
Peter Lewis received his B.A. in Physics from Oxford University and his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of California, Irvine. His research interests center on philosophy of physics, in particular the foundations of quantum mechanics. Should we think of quantum mechanics as decribing the world? If so, what kind of description does it suggest, and in what ways does it conflict with our common sense conception? If not, what is the role of quantum mechanics, and how does this reflect the nature of scientific theories in general? He is also interested in various other issues concerning the nature of belief, scientific and otherwise. Should we regard scientific theories as true, even in the face of so many false theories in the history of science? How does evidence (particularly statistical evidence) confirm scientific theories? Under what circumstances is evidence misleading? How should we judge the overall accuracy of a set of beliefs?
Contact
Department(s)
Philosophy
Education
- Ph.D. University of California, Irvine
- M.A. University of California, Irvine
- B.A. Brasenose College, Oxford University
Selected Publications
BOOKS:
Quantum Ontology: A Guide to the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics. Oxford University Press (2016).
ARTICLES:
(with Don Fallis) "Right for the wrong reasons: Common bad arguments for the correct answer to the Monty Hall problem," Synthese 207: 53 (2026).
"A dilemma for relational quantum mechanics," Principia 28: 383–399 (2024).
(with Nihel Jhou) "The indeterminate present," Inquiry 67: 1434–1447 (2024).
(with Don Fallis and Branden Fitelson) "Accuracy-first epistemology and scientific progress", Ergo 11: 4 (2024).
(with Don Fallis) "Simulation and self-location," Synthese 220:180 (2023).
"Explicating quantum indeterminacy," in Valia Allori (ed.), Quantum Mechanics and Fundamentality. Springer, 351–364 (2022).
"Against 'experience'," in Shan Gao (ed.), Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics. Oxford University Press, 140–155 (2022).
(with Don Fallis) "Animal Deception and the Content of Signals," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 87: 114–124 (2021).
(with Don Fallis), "Accuracy, conditionalization, and probabilism," Synthese 198: 4017–4033 (2021).
"Collapse Theories", in Eleanor Knox & Alastair Wilson (eds.), Companion to the Philosophy of Physics. Routledge, 247–256 (2021).
"On closing the circle", in Valia Allori, Angelo Bassi, Detlef Dürr & Nino Zanghì (eds.), Do Wave Function Jump?Springer, 121–132 (2021).
"Quantum Mechanics and its (Dis)Contents", in J. Saatsi and S. French (eds.), Scientific Realism and the Quantum. Oxford University Press, 168–182 (2020).
"On the Status of Primitive Ontology", in S. Gao (ed.), Collapse of the Wave Function. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 154–166 (2018).
(with Don Fallis), "The Brier Rule is Not a Good Measure of Epistemic Utility (and Other Useful Facts about Epistemic Betterness)", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94: 576–590 (2016).
"Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics", in J. Fieser and B. Dowden (eds.), The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/qm-inter/ (2015).
"Retrocausal Quantum Mechanics: Maudlin's Challenge Revisited", Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics44: 442–449 (2013).
"Dimension and Illusion", in A. Ney and D. Albert (eds.), The Wave Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 110–125 (2013).
"Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics", Manuscrito 33: 285–306 (2010).
"Probability, Self-Location, and Quantum Branching", Philosophy of Science 76: 1009–1019 (2009).
"Metaphysics and Quantum Physics", in R. Le Poidevin, P. Simons, A. McGonigal and R. Cameron (eds.), Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Abingdon: Routledge, 517–526 (2009).
"How Bohm's Theory Solves the Measurement Problem", Philosophy of Science 74: 749–760 (2007).
"Uncertainty and Probability for Branching Selves", Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38: 1–14 (2007).
"Quantum Sleeping Beauty", Analysis 67: 59–65 (2007).
"Conspiracy Theories of Quantum Mechanics", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57: 359–381 (2006).
"Interpreting Spontaneous Collapse Theories", Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 36: 165–180 (2005).
"Life in Configuration Space", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55: 713–729 (2004).
"Quantum Mechanics and Ordinary Language: The Fuzzy Link", Philosophy of Science 70: 1437–1446 (2003).
"Why the Pessimistic Induction is a Fallacy", Synthese 129: 371–380 (2001).
"What is it Like to be Schrödinger's cat?", Analysis 60.1: 22–29 (2000).
"Quantum Mechanics, Orthogonality and Counting", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48: 313–328 (1997).